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Financing drug discovery via dynamic
leverage
Vahid Montazerhodjat1,2, John J. Frishkopf3 and Andrew W. Lo1,2,4,5, alo-admin@mit.edu
We extend the megafund concept for funding drug discovery to enable dynamic leverage in which the
portfolio of candidate therapeutic assets is predominantly financed initially by equity, and debt is
introduced gradually as assets mature and begin generating cash flows. Leverage is adjusted so as to
maintain an approximately constant level of default risk throughout the life of the fund. Numerical
simulations show that applying dynamic leverage to a small portfolio of orphan drug candidates can
boost the return on equity almost twofold compared with securitization with a static capital structure.
Dynamic leverage can also add significant value to comparable all-equity-financed portfolios,
enhancing the return on equity without jeopardizing debt performance or increasing risk to equity
investors.
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New advances in biology and breakthroughs in
genetic research have presented the biotech-
nology and pharmaceutical industry with a host
of promising new targets and compounds to
treat a range of diseases. However, the drug
development process remains underfunded,
with investors shifting capital to other sectors
because of mediocre returns on perceived high-
investment risk. A comparison of five-year per-
iods before and after the recent financial crisis
(2004–2008 versus 2009–2013) shows that total
funding of drug R&D dropped 21%, from
US$21.5 billion to US$16.7 billion [1]. Between
2004 and 2012, funding for the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) declined by 1.8% per year in
real terms [2]. Although funding seems to be
improving over the past year in response to a
number of prominent biotech initial public
offerings, the capital inflows are highly410 www.drugdiscoverytoday.com
1359-6446/ 2015 concentrated among a few large deals, and the
number of new startups is not increasing [3]. In
fact, the lack of funding is particularly severe in
early-stage development, before Phase II clinical
trials. For example, between 2004 and 2011,
funding for prehuman preclinical R&D in the
pharma industry declined by 2.3% per year [2];
2013 saw only 63 first-time Series A financings in
biotechnology, almost 30% lower than the peak
of 89 in 2006 and the lowest level in a decade [1];
and the number of active US biotech venture
capital firms declined from 201 in 2008 to 138 in
2014 [4].
Fernandez et al. [5] proposed a ‘megafund’
financing approach, applying portfolio theory
and securitization techniques to reduce the
risk and enhance the expected returns of a
group of investments in drug development
projects. Unlike a traditional venture capital
fund, the megafund issues equity and debtThe Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article un(‘research-backed obligations’ or RBOs), and
the portfolio of projects – candidate drugs,
licensing agreements and other intellectual
property – serve as collateral for the RBOs. This
approach diversifies the typically binary drug
investment results across a portfolio of thera-
peutics, smoothing the portfolio’s payout and
reducing the volatility of its returns. Securitiza-
tion also changes the way that cash flows
are distributed from a pool of biomedical
projects, allowing a broader array of investors
to participate in the risk and expected return
of drug development according to their risk
appetite.
However, issuing securitized debt generally
requires collateral that generates a reliable and
well-understood stream of cash flows such as an
approved drug. Investments in early-stage bio-
medical projects usually yield no cash flow until
they reach Phase IIb and, even then, they provideder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drudis.2015.12.004
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licensed or sold). The unpredictability of the
amount and timing of these cash flows suggests
that the megafund is impractical for portfolios
exclusively focused on early-stage drug discov-
ery and development.
In this article, we extend the concept of the
megafund to allow for time-varying amounts of
debt or ‘dynamic leverage’, which can accom-
modate the startup phase of a fund focused
purely on preclinical R&D and early-stage
translational medicine. Dynamic leverage
adjusts the amount of debt that a securitization
vehicle can sustain, based on parameters related
to its default probability (the likelihood of the
entity being unable to meet its payment obli-
gations on a timely basis). It is directly tied to a
second concept, ‘dynamic risk measurement’, in
which the default risk of a bond is periodically
measured via certain credit metrics and perfor-
mance indicators. Together, dynamic risk mea-
surement and dynamic leverage enable us to
construct a time-varying securitization structure
that reflects the evolving nature of the portfolio’s
assets and optimizes the fund’s capital structure
accordingly.
Dynamic leverage
Dynamic leverage is motivated by a simple ob-
servation: as a portfolio of biomedical projects
progresses its risk should decrease. Therefore,
the amount of debt of a given default probability
that can be supported by this portfolio, as a
percentage of the total invested capital required,
should increase, effectively decreasing the
amount of equity required. Because cost of debt
(assumed to be 5–8% here) is lower than cost of
equity (usually in the 15–30% range), the sub-
stitution of equity by debt yields an increase in
return on equity. This default probability corre-
sponds to a rating by a Nationally Recognized
Statistical Organization (NRSO) such as Moody’s
Investors Service or Standard & Poor’s. The de-
fault probability is also referred to as a solvency
standard, whereas the debt as a percent of
capital is referred to as an attachment point.
At any point during the life of the fund there is
solvency risk, the risk that the vehicle has in-
sufficient cash to make scheduled interest and/
or principal payments. For each rating category
there is an associated solvency standard that
specifies the maximum acceptable risk of in-
solvency for that rating class until the notes are
repaid – see Table S1, provided by Moody’s
Investors Service [6] (Supplementary Material
online). The risk is calculated by examining all of
the potential outcomes, and determining what
percentage of these outcomes results in aninsolvency event. Therefore, the risk is related to
a measure of the volatility of future cash flows.
For any given rating tranche the volatility of
the corresponding cash flows can change over
time, and therefore the insolvency risk can
change. Two factors determine the potential for
change in insolvency risk. The primary factor is
whether the drug development process is pro-
ceeding in accordance to an expected plan (or to
the mean of all possible outcomes) at each time
instant. If the performance is ahead of the plan,
then the probability of insolvency should be
lower than the assumed value. In fact, if the
performance is on plan, the probability should
be lower as well because the dispersion of future
paths has narrowed, lowering the effective vol-
atility. The second factor is the possibility that
volatility has increased because of changes in
external factors, e.g., the environment or im-
proved data and forecasts. However, this class of
exogenous events is outside the scope of this
paper. For more details and an illustrative ex-
ample on dynamic leverage see Supplementary
Material online.
Dynamic measurement can be made more
precise by employing adaptive trials, during
which the posterior probability of success is
continuously updated; hence, the amount of
debt can be adjusted accordingly. However, for
simplicity we do not use adaptive clinical trials in
our model. Dynamic risk measurement is not
only useful in determining dynamic leverage but
in any application in which changes in risk have a
material impact. For example, in a financing
structure that employs guarantees, the guaran-
tee fee can be adjusted dynamically based on
the risk profile of the portfolio over time.
Dynamic leverage for an orphan drug fund
For concreteness, we use the statistical model
described in [7] to illustrate dynamic risk mea-
surement and dynamic leverage. The focus of
Fagnan et al. [7] on orphan drugs targeting rare
diseases is particularly well-suited for dynamic
leverage because these therapies are relatively
new and not likely to be able to generate much
cash flow at fund inception. To highlight the role
of dynamic leverage we employ the identical
orphan drug parameters as in Fagnan et al. [7].
Following [5,7], a discrete-time finite-state Mar-
kov chain is employed to model the evolution of
each compound through the development cy-
cle. The assumptions regarding the average cost,
success rate, duration and valuation of each
phase are listed in Table 1. Under these
assumptions, consider an RBO structure to fi-
nance a portfolio of investigational therapeutics
through their development cycle. In exchangefor a pledge of the future royalty cash flows,
equity and debt investors purchase notes and
receive a portion of these cash flow streams.
Our simulated RBO portfolio comprises nine
compounds in the preclinical stage and ten
compounds in the clinical Phase I stage. The
employed capital structure is composed of one
equity tranche and two debt tranches, namely
mezzanine and senior tranches. The initial
amounts of capital for the equity, mezzanine and
senior tranches are US$373.75 million, US$30
million and US$25 million, respectively, and the
annual coupon rates for the mezzanine and
senior debt tranches are 8% and 5%, respec-
tively. The maturity dates for the senior and the
mezzanine tranches are four and six years, re-
spectively, and the outstanding balance of each
tranche is paid in four equal installments over
the two years (four semesters) preceding the
maturity dates. After 13 semesters (6.5 years), the
portfolio of the remaining compounds is liqui-
dated. Assuming that the drug sale takes a year
to settle, the cash proceeds from the sale go to
the equity investors in the fifteenth semester.
Furthermore, any compound, upon reaching a
pre-specified target phase (Phase III in the
simulations), gets sold regardless of how far into
the life of the fund it is.
As the portfolio of compounds progresses and
its risk decreases over time, the size of the debt
tranches – and therefore the leverage – can be
adjusted to maintain a desired probability of
default for each tranche. For simplicity, the
tranche size adjustment in the simulations is
performed only for the mezzanine tranche, and
up until the junior bonds start principal repay-
ment (i.e. until the fourth year). Figure 1 illus-
trates the expected size of each tranche as well
as the total capital deployed in the portfolio,
from the equity and bond investors, over time.
Several trends in Fig. 1 are worth noting. As
seen in Table 1, the compounds need progres-
sively larger amounts of funding as they proceed
in their development cycle. If the total required
capital is raised in its entirety at the beginning of
the fund’s life, in anticipation that the com-
pounds will follow their expected path of de-
velopment, it will impose a drag on the fund’s
returns. Should this capital be raised by calling
more equity, the return on the equity tranche
would be diluted. Alternatively, if the financing
structure keeps the level of the invested equity
constant, issuing more debt at the beginning to
meet the expected needs of future drug devel-
opment, the probability of default for the debt
tranches would inevitably increase. In this ap-
proach, used in [7], the probability of default
increases because the deterioration in portfoliowww.drugdiscoverytoday.com 411
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TABLE 1
Simulation parameters for orphan drug discovery and development
Phase Cost (US$ millions) Success rate (%) Duration (years) Valuation (US$ millions)
Preclinical 5 69 1.00 7.1
Phase I 5 84 1.66 27.6
Phase II 8 53 2.09 75.6
Phase III 43 74 2.15 321.5
NDA – 96 0.80 701.9
APP – – – 817.6
Featu
res
P
E
R
S
P
E
C
T
IV
Evalue leads to more debt, whereas the equity is
the same as before. Therefore, the probability of
default and the magnitude of loss will increase if
more debt is issued at fund inception.
Dynamic leverage can mitigate this issue.
Specifically, the mezzanine tranche should in-
crease in size over time to provide the capital
required to fund the development of the com-
pounds moving forward in their development
cycle. This is done only if raising more debt does
not hurt the probability of default for the junior
notes (i.e. if it does not increase the solvency
risk). Hence, the increase in the mezzanine
tranche is slow in earlier periods, when the risk of
the portfolio is relatively high, and the debt
utilization accelerates as the portfolio moves
forward in time and risk is reduced.
A second trend seen in Fig. 1 relates to the size
of the equity tranche, which decreases over time.
This is due to distributions made to the equity
investors when the portfolio is on or above the
expected path. These distributions come from
the sale of those compounds that have reached
their target phase of development, and from a
portion of the debt raised. MATLAB code with600
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Capital structure and total deployed capital in the fu
412 www.drugdiscoverytoday.coman open-source license is provided in Supple-
mentary Material online to allow readers to
examine the specifics of how the tranche sizes are
determined at each time, and/or to use different
values for parameters used in the model.
As the risk of the portfolio decreases, we can
replace an ever-increasing amount of equity with
debt to yield a higher rate of return to the equity
investors. This can be achieved without jeopar-
dizing the solvency of the portfolio, as can be
observed in Table 2, where the simulated
expected annualized internal rate of return (IRR)
is more than 25%, and the probabilities of de-
fault for the senior and mezzanine tranches are
less than 0.1 bps and 36.2 bps, respectively.
These probabilities of default and the expected
losses, reported in Table 2, over the life horizon
of the senior and junior notes are comparable to
that of AAA/Aaa and A+/A1 rated notes, re-
spectively (Table S1 in Supplementary Material
online).
Comparison to all-equity financing
The third column of Table 2, ‘All-EQ 1’, compares
the RBO structure with an equity structure in7 9 11 13 15
e (periods)
Drug Discovery Today 
nd for each six-month period.which a portfolio of seven compounds in the
preclinical stage and six compounds in Phase I is
funded using the same level of equity as used in
the RBO structure (i.e. US$373.75 million). As
observed in Table 2, fewer compounds can be
financed during the life of the fund under the
equity structure compared with the RBO port-
folio because there is no additional injection of
capital into the equity portfolio after the initial
equity draw. The scientific impact of the equity
structure is, consequently, smaller than that of
the RBO portfolio as measured by the number of
the compounds that are sold in Phases II and III.
Not only is the scientific impact smaller in the
equity structure, but also the return character-
istics of the equity tranche are not as promising
as those of the RBO structure. Owing to the debt
issuance over time, in the RBO case, more equity
is returned to the investors earlier. In contrast,
in the equity structure the return of capital to
the equity investors is constrained by the
speed with which the compounds reach the
target phase and are sold.
The fourth column in Table 2, ‘All-EQ 2’,
compares the performance of the RBO fund and
the performance of the same portfolio of com-
pounds financed by equity alone. The amount of
equity used to finance this portfolio is matched
to the peak value of the total capital deployed in
the RBO structure (i.e. US$510.70 million) as
observed in Fig. 1. This level is almost 37% more
than the RBO’s initial equity level of US$373.75
million. As is seen in Table 2, the scientific impact
of this new equity structure is the same as that of
the RBO structure. However, the financial per-
formance of the equity structure is still less
promising than the performance of the RBO
because more equity is deployed in the equity
structure than in the RBO structure. The only area
in which the equity portfolio outperforms the
RBO portfolio is the probability of negative
returns on the equity. In the equity structure,
there is a 10.3% chance of delivering a negative
return to the equity investors, whereas this
chance is 10.6% for the RBO portfolio because
the equity tranche in the RBO structure is the first
Drug Discovery Today  Volume 21, Number 3 March 2016 PERSPECTIVE
TABLE 2
Performance results for the RBO portfolio, two equity-financed portfolios and the static
RBO portfolio
RBOa All-EQ 1a,b All-EQ 2a,b Static RBOc
Number of compounds acquired
Preclinical 10 7 10 8
Phase I 9 6 9 8
Research impact
Compounds sold in Phase II 2.6 1.8 2.6 2.2
Compounds sold in Phase III 5.5 3.8 5.5 4.7
Liabilities (US$ millions)
Capital 428.75 373.75 510.70 575.00
Senior tranche 25.00 – – 86.25
Initial mezzanine tranche 30.00 – – 115.00
Equity tranche 373.75 373.75 510.70 373.75
Equity tranche performance
Expected annualized IRR 25.1% 20.7% 22.0% 13.4%
Pr(IRR = 100%) 38.4 bps <0.1 bps <0.1 bps 60 bps
Pr(IRR < 0%) 10.6% 14.5% 10.3% 13.1%
Pr(IRR > 10%) 77.3% 69.8% 74.6% 66.7%
Pr(IRR > 25%) 49.8% 39.9% 42.0% 18.4%
Debt tranches performance
Senior tranche
Probability of default <0.1 bps – – 0.8 bps
Expected loss <0.1 bps – – <0.1 bps
Mezzanine tranche
Probability of default 36.2 bps – – 56.0 bps
Expected loss 9.1 bps – – 15.0 bps
Abbreviations: RBO, research-backed obligations; Pr, probability; IRR, internal rate of return; bps, basis points
(1 bp = 0.01%).
a All reported numbers are obtained using 20,000,000 Monte Carlo simulation paths for each portfolio.
b All-EQ 1 is an equity-financed portfolio where the initial investment is set equal to the initial amount of equity in the RBO
portfolio, whereas All-EQ 2 is another equity-financed portfolio where the initial investment is set to the maximum amount
of capital in the RBO portfolio (Fig. 1).
c For static RBO, see Fagnan et al. [7].
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Eto absorb any capital losses. For the same reason,
the probability that the equity is wiped out [i.e.
Pr(IRR = 100%)] is larger for the RBO portfolio
compared with the equity-financed portfolios.
However, the upside of the RBO portfolio is much
higher than that of the equity portfolios, as
measured by the right-tail probabilities of their
returns reported in Table 2 [i.e. Pr(IRR > 10%)
and Pr(IRR > 25%)].
It is clear that adding dynamically leveraged
debt to the picture, when feasible and as needed
to fund drug development, can enhance the
scientific and the financial impact of the port-
folio with little downside risk. Furthermore, if the
effect of dynamic leverage were replicated using
an equity-financed portfolio, the amount of re-
quired equity upfront would be significantly
larger (almost 37% more initial equity than the
RBO’s initial equity as observed in Table 2).
Comparison with static capital structure
For comparison, the performance statistics of the
RBO structure with a static capital structure,
which was used in [7], are reported in the last
column of Table 2, labeled ‘Static RBO’. The
dynamic RBO clearly outperforms the RBO with
a static capital structure from scientific and
financial perspectives. This performance supe-
riority is achieved without jeopardizing the
debt performance. Not only does dynamic
leverage increase the return on equity but it
also helps reduce the probability of default
for the bondholders in comparison to a static–10 –5 0 5 10
 in the value of approved drug (%)
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Ecapital structure. This is achieved because less
debt is borrowed initially and more debt issu-
ance happens over time only if the risk of the
portfolio permits taking such action. Further-
more, because the probability of default is
smaller for this dynamic capital structure
than the static RBO used in [7], the volatility
of the return on equity is consequently smaller
too.
Robustness analysis
We check the robustness of our results by
varying two key parameters: the value of the
approved drug (the bottom right entry in Table
1) and the correlation (r) of the asset values.
Whenever applicable, we also conduct the same
tests on one of the all-equity-financed portfolios
introduced earlier, All-EQ 2, to distinguish the
role of under- and over-borrowing from the role
that asset mispricing plays. The details are
reported in the Supplementary Material online,
and they yield two key observations. First, the
dynamic RBO portfolio maintains an acceptable
performance over a wide range of correlations
and expected approval values. Second, the dy-
namic RBO portfolio outperforms the all-equity-
financed portfolio over a wide range of corre-
lations and asset values unless the presumed
values for the parameters of the model are far
more optimistic than their realized values. In this
case, the incorrectly determined high leverage in
the dynamic RBO fund would exacerbate the
fund’s poor performance compared with the all-
equity-financed portfolio.
These findings are summarized in Fig. 2, which
shows that the equity performance of the RBO
fund – measured by its IRR – is superior to that of
the all-equity-financed portfolio over a wide
range of correlation (r) and expected-approval
values. The equity-financed portfolio, however,
outperforms the RBO portfolio for large corre-
lations (e.g. r = 40%) and small approval values
(e.g. if the realized approval value is 25% less
than the assumed value). For further details and
a comparison of other performance measures
see Supplementary Material online.
Concluding remarks
The application of portfolio theory and securi-
tization techniques to financing drug develop-
ment has the potential to be a disruptive
technology. In this paper we propose a more
efficient structure and higher returns to equity
for investors by adding dynamic leverage, a
novel securitization technique, to the megafund
structure proposed in [5,7]. There are, of course,414 www.drugdiscoverytoday.coma number of practical challenges to launching
and managing a megafund. A comprehensive
discussion of these challenges is beyond the
scope of this article, but we address some of the
most pressing issues in the Supplementary
Material online such as how the fund would
be managed, whether the parameters we have
assumed are realistic and how existing bond-
holders might react to increases in leverage.
Several other recent studies offer more-detailed
analysis of these challenges and how they can be
addressed [8–13].
The main finding of our study is that a fund
incorporating dynamic leverage requires less
upfront equity to finance the development of
the compounds in the portfolio than previous
implementations, and generates higher
returns with similar risks of default and loss.
Furthermore, the volatility of equity returns is
lower compared with a megafund structure
with a static capital structure. Borrowing more
debt over time does not adversely affect the
scientific outcome because, in the dynamically
leveraged approach, the additional debt is
only needed if the portfolio is on its expected
path.
Dynamic leverage magnifies positive and
negative performance. If the actual performance
of the portfolio of projects is better than indi-
cated by prior assumptions, then the fund with
dynamic leverage will outperform an equity-
financed portfolio. If the portfolio underper-
forms, however, then the equity-funded portfolio
will perform better. This result is expected, given
the nature of leverage. The higher volatility (risk)
of equity returns in a megafund with dynamic
leverage, as compared with an all-equity-fi-
nanced portfolio, is accompanied by a higher
expected equity return. Nevertheless, if further
securitization technologies are introduced
into the pharmaceutical portfolio structure
we expect commensurate improvements to
equity returns.
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